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Abstract in Dutch 
Wat zijn de additionele kosten van een aparte 20% doelstelling voor hernieuwbare energie als deel van 
het Europese klimaatbeleid voor 2020? In dit paper gebruiken de auteurs het algemeen 
evenwichtsmodel WorldScan om deze vraag te beantwoorden. WorldScan is daarvoor met een bottom-
up module voor de elektriciteitssector uitgebreid. Dit maakt het mogelijk om schattingen van de kosten 
en van het potentieel voor hernieuwbare energie uit bottom-up studies te gebruiken om het model te 
kalibreren. In de centrale modelvariant zijn de kosten van EU-klimaatbeleid met als doelstelling 
verhoging van het aandeel hernieuwbare energie 6% hoger dan die van een beleid zonder deze 
doelstelling. Vanwege de grote onzekerheid over het aanbod van hernieuwbare energie wordt een 
uitvoerige gevoeligheidsanalyse gedaan ten opzichte van het niveau en de stijging van de 
aanbodcurves van windenergie en biomassa. In deze gevoeligheidsanalyse variëren de additionele 
kosten van nul (wanneer het doel niet bindend is) tot 23% (wanneer we het initiële kostennadeel en de 
stijging van de kosten voor hernieuwbare energie verdubbelen ten opzichte van de centrale 
modelvariant). 
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Abstract
What are the excess costs of a separate 20% target for renewable energy as
a part of the EU climate policy for 2020? We answer this question using a
computable general equilibrium model, WorldScan, which has been extended
with a bottom-up module of the electricity sector. The model set-up makes it
possible to directly use available estimates of costs and capacity potentials for
renewable energy sources for calibration. In our base case simulation, the costs
of EU climate policy with the renewables target are 6% higher than those of
a policy without this target. As information on the supply of renewable en-
ergy is scarce and uncertain, we perform an extensive sensitivity analysis with
respect to the level and steepness of the supply curves for wind energy and
biomass. In the range we explore, the excess costs vary from zero (when the
target is not binding) to 23% (when the cost progression and the initial cost
disadvantage for renewables are doubled).
Keywords: EU climate policy, renewable energy, computable general equilib-
rium model
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In its climate policy strategy, the European Union has formulated greenhouse gas
(GHG) reduction targets that are among the most ambitious worldwide. As an out-
come of the European Council Spring Summit 2007, the EU committed itself to a
20% emission reduction in 2020, compared to 1990 levels, and even to a conditional
30% reduction objective, “provided that other developed countries commit them-
selves to comparable emission reductions” (EU Council, 2007). Climate policy has
never been seen as an isolated policy area in the EU, though. It always comes in tan-
dem with other energy policy considerations and targets. The 2007 GHG reduction
goals explicitly go under the heading of “An integrated climate and energy policy”
(EU Council, 2007, p. 11). The most prominent energy policy target is a share of
20% renewable energy in total EU energy consumption.
The purpose of this paper is a quantitative assessment of the interaction between
the renewable energy target and the EU climate policy. For this purpose, we use
the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model “WorldScan”. Lead by theoretical
reasoning, we may tend to the conclusion that the interference of an additional
target will cause excess costs of climate policy. The assessment of whether they are
of a relevant size, however, can only be carried out using a quantitative model. Only
if we have identiﬁed a plausible cost range can we go on asking whether the goals
that are presented to justify the target for renewable energy are attainable by other
means at lower costs.
The core instrument of EU climate policy is the Emissions Trading Scheme
(ETS), currently the most comprehensive emissions cap-and-trade system, which
may pave the way for coordinated, worldwide climate actions (Ellerman and Buch-
ner, 2007). Even if the ETS covers no more than roughly half of all GHG emissions
in the EU, it is set up in the spirit of least-cost abatement. Within the ETS, a uni-
form emission price is established, which serves as a standard for the marginal costs
of each potential abatement measure. A target for renewable energy interferes with
this least-cost idea by exempting this particular group of abatement options from
the common benchmark price. What is the motivation behind the special treatment
of renewable energy?
2In the “20 20 by 2020” formulation of the EU policy (EC, 2008a), the target
for renewable energy has made its way to the ﬁrst page, as one of the “two key
targets”, together with GHG reduction.1 Apart from its contribution to climate
policy (through lower GHG emissions per unit of energy), the main motive is energy
supply security. The EU wants to be less dependent on the import of oil and gas, and
better shielded against the volatility and increase of international energy prices (EC,
2008a, p. 3).2 Other possible positive consequences of renewable energy that have
been mentioned as arguments in favour of the target are the creation of jobs due
to above-average labour intensity of renewable energy, the fuelling of technological
progress, pushing the EU to technological leadership and competitive advantage in
this ﬁeld, and the fostering of regional development in rural and isolated areas (EC
2008b, p. 2).
These reasons given for renewable energy promotion illustrate an important dif-
ference between political and economic thinking. Politicians tend to start from a
given policy measure and collect positive aspects of it. Each of these aspects has
the potential to gain support from one of various interest groups, which in the end
must ensure a majority for the policy measure in question. Positive connotation
is of particular importance. In the context of renewable energy, promoting secur-
ity of supply and initiating technological progress sounds much more positive than
merely reducing GHG emissions. Economists, in contrast, disregard such connota-
tions. They start from the stated goals and look for the instruments best suited to
achieve them. Their ambition is to devise a single, separate instrument per goal,
and, consequently, they tend to be sceptical about multi-purpose instruments. The
target for renewable energy is a case in point.
In this paper, we use the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model “World-
Scan” for assessing the excess costs of the renewables energy target.3 The energy/climate
version of WorldScan has been applied to analyse a broad range of EU climate policy
options (see e.g. Boeters et al., 2007; Wobst et al., 2007). Until now, no special fo-
1Other EU energy policy targets, which we do not focus upon here, are a 10% target for biofuels
in transport, a 20% reduction in overall energy use and a 20% increase in energy eﬃciency.
2The ﬁnal negotiations for the proposal for a EU directive on renewable energy (EC 2008b)
took place at the time of the 2008/09 gas conﬂict between Russia and Ukraine.
3We do not try to quantify possible beneﬁts of renewable energy, however. Supply security, in
particular, is a question more of political risk assessment than of economic costs.
3cus has been put on renewable energy sources, however. For the present study, we
have extended WorldScan by a bottom-up module for the electricity sector, which
makes it possible to explicitly consider diﬀerent electricity generation technologies.
In calibrating this electricity module, supply functions for renewable energy are the
core element. These supply functions and their empirical foundation are discussed
extensively in the body of this paper.
Given a particular speciﬁcation of the supply functions, we can answer the ques-
tions: “What would the EU climate policy cost with and without a separate target
for renewable energy?” and “What are the excess costs of the target?” In our central
case simulation, which is as close to the institutional details of the actual EU climate
policy as the model allows, the excess costs of the target for renewable energy turn
out to be approximatley 6% of the costs the EU policy would produce without such
a target.
The data on the supply curves for diﬀerent renewable energy sources are subject
to high uncertainty. Therefore, a considerable part of the paper is devoted to an
extensive sensitivity analysis, both with regard to the costs of the ﬁrst additional unit
of renewable energy and the steepness of the curves. This sensitivity analysis shows
that excess costs of the target for renewable energy are not a universal result. We are
able to identify constellations in which a target for renewable energy actually reduces
the costs of climate policy. Explaining the driving forces behind this qualitative
switch is much more diﬃcult, however, than showing that it exists. The coexistence
of subsidies for renewable energy, pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels and the ETS-
non-ETS split generates a complicated environment where economic intuition may
fail. Interacting “second best” eﬀects are at work,4 which can be reconstructed in
explaining a particular result, but are diﬃcult to predict when designing a climate
policy regime.
The set-up of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we graphically
illustrate the basic economic argument. In Section 3, we present the model with a
special focus on the calibration of the electricity module. Section 4 summarises the
scenarios and Section 5 shows the results of the base case and the sensitivity analysis.
4The “second best” theory has been introduced by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). In second-best
situations simple blueprints for optimal tax design (e.g. “implement a uniform emission price”) fail
because of the interaction with other distortions in the economy.
4Section 6 concludes. In the appendix, we present two simple, analytical models that
isolate second-best eﬀects contributing to the complications in the model.
2 The basic economic argument
Let us start by representing climate policy in a simple, stylised model. If we have
a pre-existing cap on emissions, an additional target for renewable energy sources
(“renewables” for short) is useless at best, but likely to cause excess costs. This is
illustrated in Figure 1. The total abatement target, A, can be reached either by
installing renewables (“REN”, from right to left), or by reducing the use of fossil
energy through demand reduction, fuel switching or higher energy eﬃciency (“FOS”,
from left to right). Marginal costs both for the REN and FOS options are increasing,
and total abatement costs are minimised (shaded area) by equalising them. An
additional target on renewables (REN1) is either not binding (if it is to the right
of REN0) or it produces excess costs (heavily bounded triangle) by crowding out
cheaper FOS abatement options by more expensive REN ones.5
In a concrete policy assessment, we are not only interested in whether excess
costs exist, but also in their magnitude. Are they quantitatively so important that
they can change the overall evaluation of the policy measure in question? Figure 1
shows that the size of the triangle is determined by the diﬀerence between the costs
of renewables and the costs of the other options for emission reduction, which are
crowded out. High excess costs of a target for renewables may result not only from a
(locally) steep supply curve for renewables themselves, but also from a steep supply
curve for other options. Only if both supply curves are ﬂat will excess costs be low.
This makes clear that, for a quantitative assessment, we need a model that captures
both sides reasonably well: the renewables as well as the rest. We explain our model
choice in the following section.
In Figure 1 it is assumed that there is no further distortion than the renewables
target. In the evaluation of the actual EU policy, however, we will encounter several
of such interacting distortions: pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels, pre-existing subsidies
5At the same time the emission price drops from pA,0 to pA,1. This is an example of a situation
where the level of the emission price is not a suitable indicator of the overall costs.






for renewables and the split between ETS and non-ETS. These distortions lead
to considerable complications in the interpretation of the welfare eﬀects. In the
appendix we discuss two of the relevant distortions in a simple analytical model.
They are presented in a form analogous to Figure 1.
3 The model
From an applied modelling perspective, the diﬃcult point is that alternative meas-
ures of emission reduction (i.e. measures other than using renewables) comprise a
rather diverse collection. Emission reduction can be achieved by more eﬃcient use
of fossil fuels, by fuel switching (from coal to gas), various emission control meas-
ures for non-CO2 gases (see e.g. Lucas et al., 2007), but also by demand reduction
(less heating, less driving), and a general change in the production structure of the
economy.
Diﬀerent types of models have their speciﬁc strengths and weaknesses in captur-
ing particular subsets of these emission reduction options, and there is no model that
captures all of them equally well. Technology-oriented engineering models (“bottom-
up”) are particularly well tailored to depict the interaction and complementarity
6of particular technology options. Economic general equilibrium models have their
strengths when it comes to demand shifts and reshuﬄing of the whole production
structure (IPCC, 2001, Sec. 7.6.3).
This “bottom-up/top-down” cleavage has been narrowed down considerably –
but not fully closed – by a whole family of “hybrid” models (see Hourcade et al.,
2006, for an overview). Most of the hybrid models can clearly be traced back to
originate from one of the camps. Either they are bottom-up models with a relatively
simple macroeconomic extension (e.g. MARKAL-Macro, Messner and Schratten-
holzer, 2000), or they are general equilibrium models with some restricted bottom-
up modules (e.g. MIT-EPPA, Paltsev et al., 2005). They share, even if to a lesser
degree, the strengths and weaknesses of their respective camp of origin.
WorldScan, the model we use in this study, belongs to the second group. Tra-
ditionally it has been a pure top-down model working exclusively with aggregate
production functions. For this study, we have extended WorldScan with a bottom-up
module of the electricity sector, which represents a number of alternative electricity
generation technologies by marginal cost curves (see Section 3.2).
3.1 General structure of WorldScan
WorldScan is a multi-region, multi-sector, recursively dynamic computable general
equilibrium model based on the GTAP7 data set (Badri and Walmsley, 2008) with
base year 2004. The model is described in detail in Lejour et al. (2006). Here we
give only a brief sketch of the general model features and focus on the bottom-up
representation of the electricity sector, which is an extension prepared particularly
for this study.
The aggregation of regions and sectors can be ﬂexibly adjusted in WorldScan.
We use a version with 18 regions and 18 sectors, listed in Tables 1 and 2. Regional
disaggregation is relatively ﬁne within Europe, but coarse outside. Likewise, we
focus on the energy-related sectors, whereas other sectors are captured in a more
aggregated manner.
WorldScan is set up to analyse deviations from a baseline (“business as usual”)
path. In general, this path is not generated by WorldScan itself, but taken over from
7Table 1: Regions in WorldScan






Rest of EU 15 Other SE Asia
Poland Former Soviet Union
Rest of EU 25 Rest of the World
Table 2: Sectors in WorldScan
Cereals Electricity
Oilseeds Energy intensive sectors
Sugar crops Vegetable oils
Other agriculture Food processing
Minerals Other consumer goods
Oil Capital goods and durables
Coal Road and rail transport
Petroleum and coal products Other transport
Natural gas Other services
other models or scenario studies. For our present purposes, we use the Environ-
mental Outlook 2008 scenario generated with the TIMER model of the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency (OECD, 2008) as our baseline.
Basic inputs for the baseline calibration are time series for population and GDP
by region, energy use by region and energy carrier, and world fossil fuel prices by
energy carrier. Population is an exogenous input to the model. The other time
series are reproduced by adjusting the corresponding model parameters. GDP is









































targeted by total factor productivity (diﬀerentiated by sector), energy quantities
are targeted by autonomous energy eﬃciency, and fuel prices are targeted by the
amount of natural resources available as input to fossil fuel production.
Figure 2 shows important baseline quantities for the EU. In the use of fossil
fuels, there is a signiﬁcant shift from oil to coal. Total CO2 emissions are only
slightly increasing.6 Figure 3 shows the underlying fuel prices (relative to the EU
consumption price index). We see that the shift from oil to coal is induced by a
considerable increase in the relative oil price. The overall increase of the fossil fuel
price level is one important reason for fossil fuel use and CO2 emission growing less
than GDP (Figure 2).7
6The baseline was constructed before the credit crisis in 2008, and the recession of 2008/09 is
not included. Given our focus on the long-term eﬀects in 2020, we do not consider this a serious
defect. For the consequences of baseline adjustment due to the credit crisis for climate policy, see
Böhringer et al. (2009a).
7The oil price peaks of 2007/08 do not appear in Figure 3. We were not able to reproduce such
drastic short-term ﬂuctuations in our general equilibrium model and, given our long-term focus,
decided to smoothen the price path until 2010.
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3.2 Bottom-up representation of the electricity sector
Modelling renewables as separate electricity generation technologies, we enter the
area of “bottom-up” complements to general equilibrium models. The standard ap-
proach in CGE modelling is to base the model on the sectoral structure of the
input-output table of national accounts. To a certain extent, diﬀerent technologies
within the electricity sector are represented by the input coeﬃcients the fossil fuels
(coal-, gas- and oil-based electricity plants).
Renewable energy, in contrast, is not characterised by a particular input. Here,
technologies must be introduced as separate economic activities. In technical terms,
the addition of new activities to CGE models is a straightforward exercise (Böhringer,
1998), but the determination of the production split between the individual techno-
logies in the counterfactual simulations remains a challenge. Simply placing several
technologies with constant returns to scale into a competitive framework would result
in an implausible corner solution: exclusive use of the least expensive technology. In
the literature, several mechanisms have been proposed that produce a smooth shift
between technologies: (a) Output levels are governed by technology-speciﬁc physical
10capital, which is a Leontief input to production. The capital quantity is determined
by an investment function that is sensitive to technology-speciﬁc returns to capital
(Böhringer and Löschel, 2006). (b) Output levels are governed by technology-speciﬁc
knowledge, which is a substitutable input and whose quantity follows a logistic learn-
ing function (McFarland et al., 2004). (c) Output levels are governed by user- and
technology-speciﬁc stochastic excess costs, which results in a (logit) discrete-choice
function (Schumacher and Sands, 2007).
Each of these approaches induces its own follow-up question. How to specify
the investment function (a), the learning function (b) or the stochastic costs (c)?
In many cases, modellers resort to ad-hoc assumptions at this point because it is
extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate data. We opted for a diﬀerent approach, which
is less subtle in the mechanism applied, but as parsimonious as possible in the data
requirements for calibration. Electricity generation technologies are represented by
simple, linearly increasing supply functions and calibrated using existing estimates of
cost ranges and potentials. The technology split is determined by equalising marginal
costs across technologies.8
WorldScan captures ﬁve concrete electricity technologies: (1) fossil electricity
with a ﬂat supply curve and coal, gas and oil as imperfectly substitutable inputs,
(2) wind (onshore and oﬀshore) and solar energy, (3) biomass, (4) nuclear energy
and (5) conventional hydropower. Wind and biomass have increasing supply func-
tions, whose calibration is described in the next section. Nuclear and hydropower
are calibrated to the Environmental Outlook baseline (OECD, 2008), but do not
endogenously react in our climate policy scenarios. Figure 4 shows the quantities of
the ﬁve technologies along the baseline path.
As individual electricity technologies are not represented in the input-output
tables, the values in the aggregate electricity sector must be split up among them.
We do this with three simple assumptions: (1) Marginal costs (after taxes and sub-
sidies) are equal across technologies. (2) Fossil fuels are used as inputs in fossil
electricity generation, but not for the other electricity technologies. (3) All other
inputs (capital, labour, intermediate goods and services) are used in proportion to
8We see the main advantage of our approach in its simplicity, not necessarily in its realism.
When we discuss the supply of renewables, we can talk directly about costs and potentials, and
need not translate these into model parameters whose interpretation requires considerable eﬀort.

























































the aggregate shares. As we are mostly interested in aggregate costs, not in sec-
toral eﬀects, we do not engage in a detailed study of the input structure of diﬀerent
electricity technologies as done, for example, in Lehmann et al. (1998).
3.3 Calibration
Central to the calibration of the electricity module are the supply functions for
renewables. Three questions must be answered here: (1) which renewable sources to
include, (2) what cost range and (3) what quantity potential to assume.9 We discuss
these questions in turn.
Even though we engage in a bottom-up representation of the electricity sector,
WorldScan is not designed to cover the full range of detailed electricity generation
technologies. Instead, we have a stylised representation of some principal options.
9If we had not restricted ourselves in the ﬁrst place to linear supply functions, the choice of the
functional form would add to this. Given the data at hand, we found this too ambitious a goal for
the present version of the model. Our reading of Figure 6.4 in EEA (2009) is that linear supply
curves can be defended.
12Which of them will determine the quantitative reactions, so that we can concentrate
our calibration eﬀort on them? Resch et al. (2008) estimate that in 2020 30% of
renewable electricity in the EU-27 will be generated by biomass, 30% by wind, 25%
by hydro and 15% by solar, tidal and wave energy. We conclude from this that it is
most important to adequately model supply of wind and biomass. Hydro energy can
only be extended at very high costs, which means that not much action is taking
place here. The contribution of the other options is small, so that leaving them out
of the picture will not signiﬁcantly change the simulation results.10
As to the cost range of renewables, we use data from EC (2008c, p. 4). The
minimum and maximum costs of electricity from fossil fuels, wind and biomass are
reproduced in Table 3. WorldScan has only an aggregated fossil electricity techno-
logy, so we need to express costs in relation to a representative fossil fuel mix. We
take the average EU fuel mix in the base year 2004 (60% coal, 32% gas, 8% oil) and
multiply the shares with the midpoint of the range of the least expensive technology
per carrier (e.g. 12.5€/GJe for coal). This gives an average price of electricity from
fossil energy in the base year of 15.5€/GJe. The cost multipliers for renewables with
respect to this average fossil price are given in the right-hand column of Table 3.
In the GTAP data set, which provides the input-output information for WorldScan,
the average EU electricity cost (total amount of electricity divided by total input
costs) is higher: 20€/GJe. We assume that everything that might be responsible for
the discrepancy aﬀects renewables in proportion and therefore apply the multipliers
of Table 3 to the GTAP costs.
With the cost range given, the steepness of the supply curves is determined by
the potential capacity. Finding appropriate capacities for wind and biomass to be
used for our model has turned out to be a major challenge. The range of published
capacity estimates is extremely wide, with part of the variation caused by diver-
ging deﬁnitions. “Technical potentials”, where only the restrictions of technological
knowledge are applied, can be very high, whereas “economic potentials”, where cost
competitiveness considerations are taken into account, are much lower (see Doukas
et al., 2007, or Resch et al., 2008, for a discussion of diﬀerent deﬁnitions). Both
types of potentials pose problems when integrated into a model such as WorldScan.
10We do not model endogenous supply of nuclear energy because we consider this mostly a
political decision depending on the risk assessment of nuclear accidents and nuclear waste disposal.
13Table 3: Cost range of power generation technologies
Technology Cost range Relative to
in €(2005)/GJe fossil average
Open cycle gas turbine 18 ÷ 21
Combined cycle gas turbine 14 ÷ 17
Internal combustion diesel engine 28 ÷ 35
Combined cycle oil-ﬁred turbine 26 ÷ 29
Pulverised coal combustion 11 ÷ 14
Circulating Fluidised Bed Combustion 12 ÷ 15
Integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle 12 ÷ 15
Solid biomass 22 ÷ 54 1.43 ÷ 3.50
Biogas 15 ÷ 60 0.99 ÷ 3.86
On-shore wind farm 21 ÷ 31 1.35 ÷ 1.97
Oﬀ-shore wind farm 24 ÷ 39 1.52 ÷ 2.51
Technical potentials normally lack the restrictions that the technologies face before
market forces come into play, such as various space restrictions for wind energy
or the priority of food production in the case of biomass. Economic potentials, on
the other hand, are the outcome of cost comparisons; we want this mechanism to
be working in our model rather than imposing its outcome. We therefore rely on
technical potentials from the literature, but choose those at the lower end of the
range.
For wind, onshore and oﬀshore installations must be distinguished. For onshore
wind, we take the overall technical potential for Europe from Hoogwijk (2004, p. 133,
Table III) and apply the regional split of EEA (2009, p. 48, Table 6.8). For oﬀshore
wind, we use the constrained potential of EEA (2009, p. 34) and the regional split of
Figure 3.5 (EEA, 2009, p. 21).11 For biomass, we use the overall European potential
of Hoogwijk (2004, p. 104, Table III, Scenario A2), apply a conversion eﬃciency
of 40% (Hoogwijk, 2004, p. 101, Table II), and perform the breakdown within the
11Onshore wind: 4.0 PWh/y (14.4 EJ/y), oﬀshore wind: 2.8 PWh/y (10.0 EJ/y), regional shares
of oﬀshore wind have been approximately recovered from the ﬁgure.
14Table 4: Potential for wind and biomass in the EU






United Kingdom 3.6 0.6
Rest of EU 15 8.3 1.5
Poland 1.5 0.4
Rest of EU 25 2.3 0.5
Bulgaria and Romania 0.8 0.6
EU 27 24.4 8.8
EU in proportion with agricultural production. The resulting potentials (associated
with maximum costs from Table 3) are given in Table 4.
Constructing supply curves for renewables in this way is loaded with uncer-
tainties, both for cost ranges and potentials. Apart from the diﬀerent deﬁnitions
discussed above, this is a consequence of the fact that both costs and potentials
depend on uncertain technological developments. The further we extend the model
horizon, the larger the uncertainty range. As the steepness of the supply curves for
renewables is a core driver of the results in Section 5, we engage in an extensive
sensitivity analysis that focuses on this point. We vary the steepness of the curve
from half to double the value that results from the base case data in Tables 3 and 4.
We leave it unspeciﬁed, though, whether variations in steepness are due to changes
in cost or potential.
154 Scenarios
Our point of departure are the scenarios that have been formulated in the European
group of Round 22 of the Energy Modeling Forum (see Böhringer et al., 2009b).
These are
• “UNIFORM”: EU reduction target (-20% GHG emissions compared to 1990
in 2020) implemented through a single emission price, which is uniform across
regions and sectors.
• “UNIFORM+RET”: The same as UNIFORM, but with a 20% share of re-
newable energy in gross ﬁnal consumption as an additional target (“RET” for
“renewable energy target”).
• “ETS”: EU reduction target (-20% in 2020) implemented in the form of the seg-
mentation implied by the current European Emission Trading System (ETS),
i.e. separate targets for ETS and for the non-ETS sector in each of the EU
member countries.
• “ETS+RET”: The same as ETS, but with a 20% share of renewable energy
in gross ﬁnal consumption as an additional target.
In the base case, we combine these scenarios with the supply curves for wind energy
and biomass according to the calibration in Section 3.3. For wind, there is an initial
subsidy of 26% and the slope of the curve implies a 1.0€/GJ rise in the marginal
price with each extension of capacity by 1EJ/year. For biomass, the slope of the
curve is 6.6€/GJ per EJ/year.12 These slopes are only applied to additional units of
renewables, because this is what the price and quantity potential ranges (Section 3.3)
are about. For the renewables already existing in the baseline we assume constant
costs at the level of the ﬁrst additional unit (horizontal part of the supply curves in
Figure 5).
Figure 5 shows the variations of the base case that we use in the sensitivity
analysis. We start with the curve “base case” and the calibration point. The ver-
tical diﬀerence between the supply curve and the calibration point represents the
12We disregard the small cost discrepancy between biomass and fossil electricity in Table 3 and
do not apply an initial subsidy here.
16Figure 5: Supply curves in the sensitivity analysis
























subsidy that must be paid to the marginal unit of renewable electricity for it to be
competitive at user costs. This case is explored in Section 5.1.
In Section 5.2 we focus on the steepness of the supply curves. What are the
consequences if the curve still passes through the same point above the calibration
point, but additional units of renewable energy are more expensive (“steeper curve”)
or less expensive (“ﬂatter curve”) than in the base case?13
In Section 5.3, we look at the consequences of a parallel movement of the supply
curve for wind.14 As we keep facing the constraint that the marginal unit of wind
energy must be competitive, a parallel movement of the supply curve must be com-
pensated by an adjustment of the initial subsidy. We explore two cases: higher cost
of wind, so that the subsidy must be doubled (“high cost level”), and lower cost of
wind, so that no initial subsidy is necessary (“low cost level”).
Finally, in Section 5.4, we consider a combined case with the base-case subsidy
for renewables already present in the baseline, but no subsidy for additional units.
13We assume that the steepness of the wind and biomass supply curves changes in proportion.
14We focus on wind here, because there is no cost discrepancy for biomass in the base case.
17This gives a supply function with a step (from “low cost level” to “base case”) at the
calibration point.
5 Results
5.1 Base case calibration of renewables supply
We start with a look at the four core scenarios from Section 4 (“UNIFORM”, “UNI-
FORM+RET”, “ETS” and “ETS+RET”) with the renewables supply curves calib-
rated as in the base case of Section 3.3 (this case is indicated by a vertical line in
the ﬁgures to follow).
Figure 6 shows the emission prices in the diﬀerent scenarios. The uniform emis-
sion price is at approximately €17 per ton CO2. The segmentation into ETS and
non-ETS with the respective reduction targets of 2008 drives the emission prices
apart: €11 within ETS, €44 outside ETS.15 Given this starting point, what are
the consequences of introducing a target for renewables in addition to the generic
CO2-reduction policy?
In the UNIFORM+RET scenario, the emission price does not change at all,
because the renewables target is not binding. This can be seen in Figure 7. In the
baseline, the renewables share is at 14.5% in 2020. In the UNIFORM scenario, it
increases to 20.1% as a result of the emission price and the induced increase in the
cost of fossil electricity. In the ETS+RET scenario, in contrast, the endogenous
share of renewables remains below the target, at 19.0%. This diﬀerence between
the scenarios is a consequence of the allocation of emission rights between ETS
and non-ETS, which results in a lower emission price in ETS than in UNIFORM
and, consequently, in less ETS emission reduction than with a uniform emission
price. Introducing the target in ETS actually changes the energy mix. The diﬀerence
between endogenous share and target is small, however.
15The non-ETS emission price reported here is the emission-weighted average of all country-
speciﬁc non-ETS prices. The spread within non-ETS is even larger than between ETS and non-
ETS, with very low non-ETS prices in the Central European countries. As the eﬃciency of the
ETS-non-ETS split is not the focus on the paper, we do not discuss it further.

































































































Steepness of supply curve (relative to base case)
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19The consequences of introducing the renewables target in the ETS+RET scen-
ario are concentrated on the ETS sector. The ETS price drops from €11 to €7.
At a given reduction target for ETS as a whole, more reduction is achieved by re-
newable electricity, so that the emission price, which reﬂects the marginal costs of
all other options, must fall. The non-ETS price is hardly aﬀected at all, because we
do not consider renewables outside electricity production. In non-ETS, neither the
reduction targets nor the reduction options change, so that the only eﬀect on the
non-ETS price is through an overall change in economic activity, which is indirect
and small.
We now turn to the welfare consequences, shown in Figure 8. Welfare is given as
Hicksian equivalent variation, i.e. the income change (at baseline prices) that would
leave the representative household at the same consumption level as the respective
version of climate policy. Welfare costs of climate policy are lowest in the scenario
UNIFORM.16 Adding a target for renewables (UNIFORM+RET) produces no ex-
cess costs, because the target is not binding. The costs of the actual emission trading
system (ETS) are approximately 30% higher than those of UNIFORM. Finally, in
the scenario ETS+RET the implementation of the renewables target produces fur-
ther excess costs, and the total costs of climate policy add up to 0.40% of aggregate
consumption in the baseline.
Expressed in absolute numbers, i.e. multiplied by the baseline EU national in-
come of €16.8 trillion (real value in prices of 2005), this gives welfare costs of 63
billion Euro in 2020 for ETS, and €67 billion for ETS+RET. The excess costs of
the renewables target, €4 billion, are not particularly high, which again is a con-
sequence of the fact that the endogenous share of renewables in ETS is already close
to the target. To put the welfare eﬀect of the target in perspective, we compare
it with a partial cost calculation.17 The renewables target induces 0.70EJe of ad-
ditional renewable electricity on top of the endogenous level in ETS, divided into
0.63EJe of wind and 0.07EJe of biomass. The average excess costs (compared to
16This is what one might have expected when applying ﬁrst-best principles of environmental
regulation. However, below, we will encounter cases where UNIFORM is not the scenario with the
lowest welfare costs.
17This partial calculation is not independent of the actual model runs, though. Quantity and
price diﬀerences are taken from the scenario results.




















































the fossil mix replaced) are 8.6€/GJ for wind and 0.4€/GJ for biomass, which,
multiplied with the quantities, amounts to €5.4 billion. This is somewhat higher,
but in the same range as the welfare eﬀects expressed in equivalent variation.18
5.2 Varying steepness of the renewables supply curves
Until now, we have focused on the points on the vertical lines in Figures 6 to 8.
These lines mark the base case with supply curves for renewables as described in
Section 3.3. To the left, we have less steep supply curves, to the right steeper ones.
The steepness varies from half to double the base case value. All supply curves pass
through the same quantity-price combination in the baseline (“calibration point” in
Figure 5).
Steeper supply curves reduce the renewables share (Figure 7) both in the UNI-
FORM and ETS scenarios, because renewables become comparatively less attractive
as abatement options. This is reﬂected in the emission price, which is increasing in
18See Appendix A.3 for an interpretation of the diﬀerence between partial and general equilibrium
costs.
21the steepness of the supply functions (Figure 6). With the ETS-non-ETS split in
place, the eﬀects are segment speciﬁc. The non-ETS price hardly reacts to the costs
of renewables at all, whereas the ETS price increases. When the renewables target
is binding (UNIFORM+RET to the right of the separation from UNIFORM, and
ETS+RET), emission prices are virtually ﬂat. This is because the amount of re-
newables is ﬁxed by the target, and the cost of the other options does not change
(apart from very small general equilibrium eﬀects).
The eﬀect of the steepness of the supply curves on the excess costs of the re-
newables target (Figure 8) is more diﬃcult to explain. Surprisingly, generic climate
policy (UNIFORM and ETS) does not become more expensive with steeper supply
curves. In UNIFORM, the costs are virtually constant, and in ETS, they are even
decreasing. The key to this eﬀect is in the pre-existing subsidy for wind. By subsid-
ising wind, the government forces more of this energy source into the climate policy
solution than would have been eﬃcient. Higher costs of wind counteract this eﬀect
and can lead to a welfare gain. The bad thing about a steeper supply curve is that
each marginal unit becomes more expensive. The good thing about it is that less
wind enters into the solution, with less subsidy to be paid and less excess costs to
be borne by the economy. At a high subsidy level, the second eﬀect may dominate.
Appendix A.2 shows this in a simple analytical model.
The excess costs of introducing a renewables target (UNIFORM+RET vs. UNI-
FORM and ETS+RET vs. ETS in Fig. 8) are, as expected, increasing in the steep-
ness of the supply curves. This results from the combination of two eﬀects. First,
each individual unit of renewables becomes more expensive. Second, the renewables
target becomes more ambitious, because the gap between the endogenous renew-
ables share (Figure 7) and the target is the larger the steeper the supply curves. As
we have already seen in the base case, the renewables target is not binding in the
UNIFORM scenario when supply curves are ﬂat, so that excess costs are zero.
5.3 Variation in the cost level of wind
Some of the eﬀects that appeared in Section 5.2 can be highlighted by introdu-
cing an additional dimension to the sensitivity analysis: the cost level of the initial
unit of additional wind. We assume that the cost diﬀerence with fossil electricity is
22compensated by a pre-existing subsidy, so that the baseline quantity of wind is com-
petitive. A high (low) cost diﬀerence thus corresponds to a high (low) pre-existing
subsidy.19
In Section 5.2, we have looked at the consequences of a variation in the steepness
of the supply curve, while keeping the producer costs of the ﬁrst additional unit of
wind constant. In our base case calibration, these costs are 35% higher than those
of fossil electricity. We now introduce two variants. In the ﬁrst, we eliminate the
cost diﬀerence, so that the pre-existing subsidy disappears as well. In the second
variant, we double the cost disadvantage of wind to 70%, with a correspondingly
higher subsidy.
The scenario outcomes for the emission prices (Figure 6) and the endogenous
renewables shares (Figure 7) are hardly aﬀected by these variations. This is because
the user prices (producer prices less subsidy) are, apart from small general equilib-
rium feedback, the same in all variants. The main eﬀects are in the total resources
necessary to produce electricity and in the size of the subsidy payments.20 These
eﬀects show in the welfare changes, which are given in Figures 9 (low cost level with
no initial subsidy) and 11 (higher cost level).
As one would expect, with lower producer costs of renewables (no subsidy), the
general cost level of climate policy is lower than in the base case (Figure 9 compared
to 8). Contrary to the base case, welfare costs are now unambiguously increasing in
the steepness of the supply curves. However, a new counterintuitive eﬀect occurs: the
renewables target is welfare enhancing (if binding). The reason is that pre-existing
taxes on fossil fuels constitute an excess burden on reducing CO2 by means of using
less of these fuels. The subsidy for wind (in the base case) acts as a countervailing
excess burden on reducing CO2 by renewables. In the low cost scenario, renewables
are a cheaper option in terms of social costs, but because of the pre-existing taxes,
this is not transmitted to producers and consumers via price signals. In this setting,
an additional renewables target acts as a correction of pre-existing ineﬃciencies and
increases welfare (in relation to a climate policy without renewables target).
19We focus on wind in this section, because only for wind is there a pre-existing subsidy in the
base case calibration.
20WorldScan has no separate government sector, all tax revenues and subsidy payments aﬀect
the budget of the representative household in a lump-sum fashion.





















































This interpretation of the results can be conﬁrmed by running an auxiliary scen-
ario, in which ﬁrst all existing taxes on energy are abolished and then a uniform
carbon price is introduced. The price will be much higher than in the scenarios with
pre-existing taxes (because cutting energy taxes has an expanding eﬀect), but the
result will nevertheless be closer to the eﬃcient choice of abatement options.21 We
have run such a scenario in the low cost case, and the endogenous renewables share
turned out to be higher than 20% in UNIFORM and for low and medium steepness
values in ETS. With the energy taxes in place, we are below 20%, which generates
the potential for welfare improvements through a renewables target. In Appendix
A.1, we present a simple analytical model that isolates this case.
If we impose a binding renewables target in the model version without taxes,
the welfare eﬀects become intuitive again. To maintain comparability with the other
model variants, we impose a renewables target that becomes binding at the base case
steepness of the wind supply function in the UNIFORM scenario (25.4%). Figure
21Still we cannot expect to have achieved a ﬁrst-best solution, because other distorting taxes in
the model remain.
























































10 shows the resulting welfare eﬀects. Now the renewables target produces excess
costs once it becomes binding.22
Figure 11 shows the welfare eﬀects in the case where the cost disadvantage of
wind energy is doubled, so that a higher subsidy is needed to make the marginal
unit of wind energy competitive. Reassuringly, the eﬀects conﬁrm our analysis of the
other model variants. The welfare costs of the scenarios without renewables target
are again (as is ETS in Fig. 8) decreasing in the steepness of the renewables supply
curves, and even more so, because the savings in subsidy payments are the higher
the higher the level of the subsidy. The excess costs of the renewables target are
higher as well, which is the mirror image of the case without subsidies.
22The general level of welfare eﬀects in Figure 10 is positive, which means that the distortions
through pre-existing energy taxes are higher than the costs of climate policy. This deserves a closer
look, but is outside the focus of the present paper.




















































5.4 No subsidy for additional units of wind
Until now, we have assumed that any subsidy needed to make the marginal unit of
wind competitive is also applied to additional units. A subsidy for wind was part
of the baseline set-up, as were pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels. However, subsidies
for wind are most probably the result of some sort of renewables-promotion policy.
Even if we cannot remove the subsidies from the initial situation (because this would
make it impossible to reproduce the exogenous baseline), we can treat any subsidy
for additional units of wind as part of the counterfactual policy. This is what we do
in this section, generating a supply function with a step at the calibration point (see
Section 4).
Removing the subsidy for additional units of wind has two eﬀects, which work
in opposite directions when it comes to the welfare costs of a renewables target. On
the one hand, the cost level of renewables faced by private investors increases. This
means that a generic climate policy (UNIFORM or ETS) produces a lower level of
renewables than in the base case (see Figure 12). The gap between the endogenous
renewables share, 16.6%, and the target is now larger, so that imposing the target

















































Steepness of supply curve (relative to base case)
TARGET UNIFORM ETS BASELINE
becomes more expensive. On the other hand, restricting the subsidy removes a dis-
tortion that led to an ineﬃcient mix within renewables (more subsidised wind at
the expense of biomass), which reduces costs. Which of these two eﬀects is larger
cannot be determined a priori.
Figure 13 shows the welfare eﬀects in the scenario without a pre-existing subsidy
for additional wind. Compared to the base case (Figure 8), welfare costs may be
higher or lower, depending on climate policy institutions and the steepness of the
supply curves. In the UNIFORM variant, we observe a similar phenomenon as earlier
in the “high cost level” scenario: a renewables target may be welfare enhancing. This
is made possible by the second-best eﬀect caused by initial taxes on fossil fuels
(see Appendix A.1). By eliminating the ineﬃciency caused by the subsidy for wind,
we make additional renewables more attractive, and the conditions under which
they outperform other options of emission reduction become less restrictive. This
is particularly the case in the UNIFORM scenario, because the highest taxes are
in non-ETS (taxes on transport fuels), and UNIFORM makes the re-allocation of
abatement eﬀorts between ETS and non-ETS possible.





















































In the ETS scenario, the quantity eﬀect of the subsidy for wind turns out to
be dominating, so that the excess cost of the renewables target is roughly 50%
higher than in the base case (0.03% of national income, €5.8 billion). Again, we
can compare this with a partial cost calculation, such as the one in Section 5.1.
Now we have 2.37 EJe of renewable electricity induced by the target, divided into
1.23 EJe of wind and 1.14 EJe of biomass (i.e. a larger share of biomass, because
additional wind is not subsidised any more). The average excess costs are 6.6€/GJ
for wind and 3.9€/GJ for biomass, now more in line with one another than in the
base case. This amounts to total partial costs of €12.6 billion. The discrepancy with
the welfare costs in general equilibrium is considerably larger than in the base case.
This is analysed in more detail in Appendix A.3.
6 Conclusions
Including a 20% target for renewable energy in the EU climate policy package
increases the welfare costs by 6%, which is 0.02% of EU national income or approx-
28imately €4 billion (in constant prices of 2005) in 2020 (see Figure 8). This amount
can be interpreted as the implicit cost of using the renewable energy target for other
than climate policy goals, in particular as a contribution to energy supply security.
If the EU had a uniform price for all CO2 emissions, the target for renewables would
not be binding, and hence produce no excess costs.
We have made use of the computable general equilibrium model WorldScan to
generate these results. WorldScan has been extended by an electricity sector module
where diﬀerent electricity supply options are calibrated separately and the electricity
mix is determined by equalising marginal supply costs across all options. As in any
large, applied economic model, the results are subject to uncertainty with respect
to both the model mechanisms and the underlying data. We focus on one particular
dimension of this uncertainty: uncertainty with regard to the costs of renewable
energy sources, captured in a variation of both the level and the steepness of the
supply curves.
In the sensitivity analysis it becomes apparent that pre-existing taxes on fossil
fuels, pre-existing subsidies for renewables and the split between ETS and non-ETS
produce second-best eﬀects that are not straightforward to interpret. The most
important results from the sensitivity analysis are the following.
• The welfare costs of climate policy without a renewables target are decreasing
in the steepness of the renewables supply function, except when the initial
subsidy on renewables is very low.
• The welfare costs of climate policy with a renewables target are increasing
in the steepness of the renewables supply function once the target becomes
binding, irrespective of the subsidy level.
• The excess costs of the renewables target are increasing in the steepness of the
renewables supply function.
• The excess costs of the renewables target are increasing in the level of the
pre-existing subsidy for renewables. If this subsidy is very low, the renewables
target may even be welfare-enhancing, due to the distortions generated by
pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels.
29• The highest excess costs in the sensitivity analysis are generated when both the
initial cost disadvantage and the steepness of the supply curve are maximal.
If both values are doubled with respect to the base case, policy excess costs
increase to 31%.
• A pre-existing subsidy for wind, which distorts the minimum-cost renewables
mix, reduces the excess costs of the renewables target because, at the same
time, it increases the endogenous renewables share.
While we scrutinise variations in the level and steepness of the renewables supply
functions, other aspects of the model remain in the background. Some of them have
a potentially signiﬁcant impact on the costs of climate policy with or without a
target for renewables as well. We close the paper with a list of factors that should
be kept in mind when placing the results in the broader discussion of the pros and
cons of a speciﬁc renewables policy.
• The cost curves for renewables we use are static, they do not include cost
reduction through endogenous technological change. If there are signiﬁcant
learning-by-doing eﬀects, high renewables shares in early periods would reduce
the welfare costs of climate policy later on. This is not explicitly included in
the model. However, one possible interpretation of ﬂat supply curves in the
sensitivity analysis is that they are a result of such endogenous technological
change.
• We focus on two varieties of renewables: wind and biomass in electricity gener-
ation. These are quantitatively the most important options, but not the only
ones. Sun and tidal/wave energy in the electricity sector as well as biofuels
in transport and biomass for space heating are further potential contributors.
We have them in the baseline, but they do not react in the policy counterfac-
tuals, because we did not ﬁnd suitable data for calibrating plausible supply
functions. The eﬀects of adding supply functions for these options would be
similar to those of lowering the steepness of curves for existing options.
• We treat electricity from all sources as perfectly substitutable. This is legit-
imate for each point in time, but neglects the temporal aspect of electricity
30supply. Wind (as well as sun) is an intermittent energy source, it is not always
available, and its availability is not necessarily in line with energy demand
(Heal, 2009). Again, this problem is to a certain degree taken care of by our
sensitivity analysis. One possible interpretation of ﬂatter/steeper supply curves
is optimism/pessimism with respect to the cost development of electricity stor-
age technologies.
• The baseline of WorldScan is taken over from the OECD Environmental Out-
look and not generated by the model itself. This is common practice in CGE
modelling, but may produce problems in the interpretation of the results. In
particular, the baseline share of renewables (14.5%) is not necessarily identical
with the one that would have been generated by the model as an endogen-
ous reaction based on the supply curves assumed. Given that the endogenous
model reaction is restricted to wind and biomass supply, there is no simple
way of closing the gap between calibration and simulation. A smaller share
of renewables in the baseline would amplify all eﬀects of the renewables tar-
get. For small changes in the baseline renewables share we expect changes in
the results that are proportional to the diﬀerence between baseline share and
target.
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35Appendix
A.1 The role of pre-existing taxes on fossil fuels
There are two abatement options: reducing the use of fossil fuels and introducing
renewables. Reduction of fossil fuels, a , comes with constant marginal cost,23 ca = α,
and linear total cost, Ca = αa. In addition, option a leads to excess costs, caused by
pre-existing taxes, γ.24 Social costs of option a are therefore cs
a = α+γ. Introducing
renewables, b, has increasing marginal cost, cb = βb and, correspondingly, quadratic
total costs, Cb = 1/2βb2. Implementing a reduction target A will generate an emission





because private actors set the emission price equal to the marginal (private) abate-
ment cost:
α = βb. (1)
The rest of the abatement is done by a at constant marginal costs of α.25
a = A − b = A −
α
β
The total social costs of abatement are then
C = C
s





As private and social costs of option a diverge, there are possible welfare gains








23The following generalises to the case where the marginal costs of a are increasing, but this
complicates the calculations.
24This is an extreme simpliﬁcation of the excess costs that result from taxation in general equi-
librium. To model these costs accurately, a full general equilibrium model with utility function
would be needed. This would destroy the simplicity of the example.
25We assume that A is suﬃciently high so that reduction by reducing fossil fuels is necessary:
A > α/β.







Observing da = −db and α = βb (equation 1), this gives
dC
db
= −γ < 0.
This is illustrated in Figure 14. The shaded area comprises the total social cost
of abatement, which result from equating line βb with α. Moving the amount of
renewables from b0 to b1 reduces the cost by the area with the bold borderline.
A.2 The role of a pre-existing subsidy for renewables
Consider once again the model of Appendix A.1. Now there are no excess costs for
abatement option a, but an initial subsidy for renewables, s. Social marginal costs
of renewables are still cs
b = βb, but private costs are reduced to cb = (1 − s)βb by
the subsidy.
Private abatement is governed by equalising private marginal abatement costs
of both options:
α = (1 − s)βb
















Total social cost of abatement is
C = Ca + C
s







































This becomes negative (i.e. a welfare gain through a steeper supply curve) if s > 0.5.
38The countervailing eﬀects of a steeper supply curve are illustrated in Figure 15.
With the original supply curve (βb), the subsidy brings the quantity b0 into the
solution. A steeper supply curve reduces this to b1. This has two eﬀects on the
total social cost of abatement (the shaded area). On the one hand, the amount
of renewables is reduced, which reduces the amount of subsidy to be paid and the
amount of renewables that cause excess costs (the heavily bounded shaded area). On
the other hand, each remaining unit of renewables has higher cost now (the heavily
bounded triangle on top of the old supply curve). Which of these eﬀects dominates
depends on the parameter values. With a linear supply curve, the critical value of
the subsidy (approximately the case of Figure 15), where the two eﬀects precisely
cancel out, is at s = 0.5.
A.3 Diﬀerence between partial and general equilibrium costs
The partial cost calculations in Sections 5.1 and 5.4 are an important benchmark
for the plausibility of the range of the welfare costs in general equilibrium. However,
they generate new interpretation challenges. How is it possible that partial costs
more than double in the no-subsidy scenario (Section 5.4, relative to the scenario
with subsidy in Section 5.1), but that the increase in welfare costs is much more
moderate?
The relation between partial and general equilibrium costs is illustrated in Fig-
ures 16 and 17. Both ﬁgures contain the marginal costs of increasing the renewables
share by one percentage point.26 There are four curves in both Figures, two for
each scenario (with and without pre-existing subsidy for additional wind energy).
The curves labelled “partial” depict the partial costs as calculated in the main text:
incremental quantities of renewables multiplied with their respective excess input
costs compared to the fossil electricity mix. If we deduct the partial costs from the
general equilibrium welfare eﬀect, we obtain a residual “second-best” eﬀect (labelled
“sec. best” in the Figures). This second-best eﬀect is negative (welfare losses are
lower than partial costs), and it is decreasing (in absolute terms) in the level of
the target. The fact that the resulting second-best costs are almost precisely the
26These cost curves have been generated by running the model with gradually increasing targets
and calculating the cost diﬀerences.
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40same in both scenarios conﬁrms that this is an actual model property, not simply
an accounting residual.
If we take the integral over the marginal costs from the endogenous renewables
share to the target, we obtain total excess costs. This is the shaded area in Figures 16
(for the scenario with subsidy) and 17 (for the scenario without). The area above the
zero line (shaded downwards) counts as positive, the area below (shaded upwards)
as negative. Figure 16 reproduces the cost calculations from Section 5.1. The partial
cost area is €5.4 billion , the second-best area -2.4, resulting in a net welfare eﬀect
of €4 billion.
Figure 17 shows the situation of the partial cost calculation of Section 5.4. The
partial cost area, €12.6 billion, is now more than twice as large as in Figure 16.
However, the second-best area increases even more proportionally, because it is ex-
tended to lower levels of renewables, where second-best costs are higher (in absolute
terms). Therefore the increase in welfare costs from Figure 16 to 17 is much smaller
than the partial calculations suggest.
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